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Lecture
Mayteenth*
Jim Chent
"[I]n this our noble land, memory is all: touchstone, threat and
guiding star. Where we shall go is where we have been; where we
have been is where we shall go-but with a difference. For as we
* This lecture draws upon three presentations made in commemoration
of the semicentennial of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S 483 (1954). The
first, Taking Jim Crow out of the Constitution: How the Supreme Court Moved
from Plessy to Brown, took place at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota,
on April 20, 2004. The second presentation consisted of comments at the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's ceremony honoring Brown's fiftieth anniversary, con-
ducted at the Minnesota State Law Library in Saint Paul on May 17, 2004.
Finally, on July 22, 2004, 1 took part in another reenactment and discussion of
Brown at a program called To Win Equality by Law: Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, sponsored by the Hennepin County Bar Association and the Minnesota
Association of Black Lawyers. I thank Rabbi Joan S. Friedman, associate
chaplain and coordinator of Carleton College's Program in Ethical Reflection,
for the opportunity to speak in Northfield. Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz and
Daniel Lunde, head of library development and special projects at the Minne-
sota State Law Library, conferred upon me the extraordinary honor of ad-
dressing my state's highest court at a ceremony marking the impact of twenti-
eth-century America's most important judicial decision. Sonia Miller-Van Oort
organized the July 22 event, which brought Brown to life for an audience
drawn from the general public. These individuals deserve, and receive, my
profound appreciation.
t Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor of
Law, University of Minnesota Law School, chenx064@maroon.tc.umn.edu. Ap-
ropos of this lecture's geographic and historical setting, scriptural references
are to the Authorised (King James) Version of the Bible. Guy-Uriel Charles,
Daniel A. Farber, Gil Grantmore, Alex M. Johnson, Jr., and Ruth Okediji pro-
vided helpful comments. Elizabeth Maxeiner supplied very capable research
assistance. Elizabeth Steblay transcribed an oral presentation in which I effec-
tively outlined the kernel of this lecture. Special thanks, as always, to Kath-
leen Chen.
As this lecture will make apparent, I divided my childhood between his-
torically black schools in the city of Atlanta and historically white schools in
DeKalb County, Georgia. Only later in life did I begin to appreciate more fully
the hardships that segregation inflicted and the personal struggles that many
of my teachers and classmates undertook in order to overcome the South's rac-
ist legacy. Though the gesture hardly seems commensurate, I dedicate this
lecture to them.
203
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
proceed toward our destination, it is ever changed by the trans-
formations wrought by our democratic procedures and by the life-
affirming effects of our spirit. Here we move ever toward past-
future, by moonlight and by starlight, soaring by dead reckoning
along courses mapped by our visionary fathers!"'
I. THE BETTER MUSES OF OUR NATURE
Clio, muse of history, is a fickle mistress. Not long ago in the
collective memory of the American people, Brown v. Board of
Education2 enjoyed a status befitting "the single most honored
opinion in the Supreme Court's corpus."3 At least while Brown
was young, before the stubborn task of implementation compro-
mised its promise, observers hailed the case as the herald "of ef-
fective enforcement of civil rights in American law."4 If not "the
most important decision in the history of the Court," Brown was
at a minimum "the watershed constitutional case of [the twenti-
eth] century."5
Brown, alas, has reached middle age and, with it, the iden-
tity crisis that routinely accompanies lost youth.6 As of May 17,
1. RALPH ELLISON, JUNETEENTH: A NOVEL 16 (John F. Callahan ed.,
1999).
2. 347 U.S 483 (1954).
3. Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education-A Critical Introduction,
in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUcATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S
TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERIcA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3,
4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
4. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 286 (1993).
See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 709-10
(1975); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 69 (2001) ("The decision cut through a
tissue of lies that white Southerners and others had woven to maintain the sub-
servient status of black people. It offered the possibility of long-awaited change
that other political institutions-the Congress, state legislatures-seemed
wholly incapable of producing.'); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegre-
gation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34-44
(1979); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 689,
689-90 (1971) (describing Brown as the decision that marked the Warren Court
as a "major force in the American constitutional system").
5. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 286; see also HUGH W. SPEER, THE CASE OF
THE CENTURY: A HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF TOPEKA WITH PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 274 (1968).
6. Cf. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 74 (1955) ("The life cycle of an independent commission can be di-
vided into four periods: gestation, youth, maturity, and old age.'); JOHN K.
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929, at 171 (1955) ("[R]egulatory bodies, like
the people who comprise them, have a marked life cycle. In youth they are "igor-
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2004, Brown "passed [its] fiftieth birthday" and became "half as
old as the century that had died" shortly before. 7 Laws, like the
men and women they govern, "do not often live as long as centu-
ries."8 No man who argued or decided the case lives today, and
many of the decision's intellectual heirs now make their living by
systematically dismantling Brown's image as "a beloved legal and
political icon."9
A prominent trio of books marking Brown's fiftieth anniver-
sary repudiates that decision's integrationist ideal. Charles Ogle-
tree echoes the sentiment of "[mlany communities at the center of
the battle for integration": "welcom[ing] something less than the
full integration demanded by the civil rights lawyers" who won
Brown and tried to have it fulfilled.10 Sheryll Cashin similarly
describes the "emerging 'post-civil rights' attitude among black
folks" as one of "ambivalent integration[," typified by a desire
"not [to be] overwhelmed by white people" and to have "plenty of
your own kind around to make you feel comfortable."11 Derrick
Bell overtly argues that America would have been better off if
Brown had affirmed Plessy v. Ferguson12 while ordering the
"strict enforcement" of Plessy's infamous "separate but equal"
standard.13 Views such as these, which once "might have been
more easily attributed to an avowed racist," now characterize
many an academic's definition of Brown's legacy.14
This mournful view of Brown pays homage not to Clio, but
ous, aggressive, evangelistic, and even tolerant. Later they mellow and in old
age... they become... either an arm of the industry they are regulating or se-
nile."). On cycles in legal history, see generally GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW (1977); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF
AMERICAN HISTORY (1986).
7. THOMAS WOLFE, LOOK HOMEWARD ANGEL 20 (1929).
8. Id.
9. Balkin, supra note 3, at 3. On the honored academic tradition of carp-
ing, see generally Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3
CONST. COMMENT. 307 (1986); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293
(1984).
10. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 296 (2004).
11. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM, at xiii (2004).
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954).
13. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 22 (2004).
14. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice:
Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1409
(1993).
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rather to Melpomene, the somber muse of tragedy. In a grand re-
versal of living history, the deep resentment with which Southern
whites once regarded Brown is now the emotional domain of
many leading civil rights scholars. Although "[n]o federal judicial
nominee and no mainstream national politician today would dare
suggest that Brown was wrongly decided,"1 5 even in a South that
has not yet fully discharged "the awful responsibility of Time," 16
the academy has all but abandoned Brown. The Supreme Court's
landmark desegregation decision offers at best "equality by proc-
lamation";17 at worst, it is "a mirage,"' 8 a "splendid bauble" of
vacuous legalism intended to appease and deceive the masses.' 9
At fifty years of age, Brown seems doomed to "swell the rout / of
[cases] that wore their honours out, / Runners whom renown out-
ran / And the name died before the [law]." 20 Ars longa, lex brevis:
In a mobile country whose highest court rarely needs "[tiwenty-
five years... to complete a constitutional hiccough,"21 each suc-
ceeding generation freely rejects those "ideas and aspirations" not
fit to "survive more ages than one."22
The embittered view of Brown finds its voice in an idiom fa-
miliar in the states of the old Confederacy: 'The harvest is past,
the summer is ended, and we are not saved."23 Brown's stalwart
defenders may likewise respond in the oral tradition of Southern
Christianity, black or white: a prophet "is not without honour,
save in his own country, and in his own house."24 Somewhere be-
tween jeremiad and gospel lies the mission of the legal scholar
who earnestly seeks to discover Brown's place in America's con-
tinuing exodus from the bondage of racism: "And thou shalt teach
them ordinances and laws, and shalt shew them the way wherein
15. Balkin, supra note 3, at 4.
16. ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN 464 (1946).
17. BELL, supra note 13, at 136 (citing Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 717 (1992)).
18. BELL, supra note 13, at 136.
19. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819) (Mar-
shall, C.J.); accord Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 87 (1890) (Lamar, J., dis-
senting); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 (1883) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
20. A.E. HOUSMAN, To an Athlete Dying Young, in COLLECTED POEMS AND
SELECTED PROSE 41 (Christopher Ricks ed., 1988).
21. Jim Chen, DeFunis, Defunct, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 91, 98 (1999).
22. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901
(1992).
23. Jeremiah 8:20. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
24. Matthew 13:57.
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they must walk, and the work that they must do."25
In the face of criticism designed to demote Brown from hero
to villain, or at least to condemn the decision's false promise, per-
haps we should simply speak of the case as it is: "Nothing ex-
tenuate, / Nor set down aught in malice."26 Once we know that a
story is "true," "the question of whether it is sad or happy has no
meaning whatever."27 In response to "prophets, old or young,"
who "[b]awl out their strange despair," we should heed the advice
of an epic poet who explored another prominent Brown in the his-
tory of American race relations:
If you at last must have a word to say,
Say neither, in their way,
"It is a deadly magic and accursed,"
Nor "It is blest," but only "It is here."28
An honest assessment of Brown therefore "teach[es] us to
number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom."
29
The collective memory of the United States traverses centuries,
but very few exact dates loom large across that span. Asked to
name several exact dates of note in the nation's history, the aver-
age American might start and stop with July 4, 1776. Perhaps
the most memorable dates of the past century are those marking
tragic events: December 7, 1941; November 22, 1963; September
11, 2001. Moments of national triumph, oddly enough, are rarely
remembered as exact dates. The three "victory" dates associated
with the twentieth century's World Wars-November 11, 1918;
May 8, 1945; and August 14, 1945-shine dimly, if at all, in
America's collective memory. D-Day (June 6, 1944) eclipses all
three of these dates, and Armistice Day probably outranks both
V-E Day and V-J Day if only because it became the basis for a
widely observed holiday, Veterans' Day.
By this admittedly imperfect standard of social significance,
Supreme Court decisions rate fairly low. In the Court's entire his-
tory, perhaps only two decisions figure so prominently in public
memory that their exact dates are readily recalled by even a
small fraction of lawyers. Brown qualifies as one of those two de-
cisions. Among dates in Supreme Court history, only January 22,
25. Exodus 18:20.
26. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act 5, sc. 2, 11. 351-52, in WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 819, 853 (Stanley Wells et al. eds., 1988).
27. BERNHARD SCHLINK, THE READER 217 (Carol Brown Janeway trans.,
1997).
28. STEPHEN VINCENT BENT, JOHN BROWN'S BODY 377 (1928).
29. Psalms 90:12; cf. 1 Chronicles 29:15 ("[Olur days on the earth are as a
shadow, and there is none abiding.").
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1973,30 rivals May 17, 1954, in fame. To put the matter in per-
spective, July 24, 1974, and December 12, 2000, languish in ob-
scurity, even those two dates mark the only occasions on which
the Supreme Court has practically-if not formally-installed a
new President.31 Brown's distinction should not be overstated;
May 17, 1954, arguably does not even rank as the most important
date in the annals of civil rights law. On July 2, 1964, exactly 101
years to the day after the 20th Maine Infantry repelled the 15th
Alabama Infantry from Gettysburg's Little Round Top, President
Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32
The semicentennial of Brown v. Board of Education is an apt
occasion on which to ponder whether Brown is worth remember-
ing every year and, if so, to what end. In symbolic terms, the date
that most resembles May 17, 1954, in American history at large,
is June 19, 1865. On that day, a Union regiment led by Major
General Gordon Granger landed at Galveston, Texas. The
Granger regiment not only reported the two-month-old news that
the Civil War had ended with Robert E. Lee's surrender at Ap-
pomattox Courthouse on April 9, 1865, but also enforced (nearly
two and a half years after the fact) the Emancipation Proclama-
tion of January 1, 1863. "Juneteenth" is now observed officially in
Texas as "the anniversary of the event of emancipation from
slavery that occurred in Texas on June 19, 1865."33 "Remember
this day, in which ye came out from Egypt, out of the house of
bondage. .. ."34 Once an obscure celebration known only to black
Texans, Juneteenth has gained broader geographic and demo-
graphic popularity as a commemoration of liberty, equality, and
civil rights.3 5 Juneteenth is, as it were, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
birthday without the tragedy. 36
As an epochal event, Juneteenth managed rather remarka-
bly to arrive both too late and too early. The two-month delay in
reporting the news of the Confederacy's defeat and the two-year
delay in the enforcement of the Emancipation Proclamation
30. Which of course was the day on which Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
was decided.
31. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
32. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
33. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 448.001 (Vernon 1998).
34. Exodus 13:3.
35. See Julia Moskin, Late to Freedom's Party, Texans Spread Word of
Black Holiday, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at Al.
36. See id.
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would prove to be trivial in comparison with the glacial pace of
legal reform after the Civil War. The nominal end of slavery fore-
shadowed the bitter disappointment of Reconstruction and the
strange career of Jim Crow.37 A full lifetime after the end of Re-
construction, William Faulkner described all too perfectly the
grip of slavery's dead hand: "The past is never dead. It's not even
past."38 Most of the slaves emancipated in 1865 never enjoyed
some of the simplest and most essential civil rights. Meaningful
protection of the right to vote without regard to race or color, to
name merely one example, would wait more than a century. Ex-
actly 100 years and 48 days elapsed between Juneteenth and the
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 39
To celebrate Juneteenth, in other words, is to acknowledge
unfinished business. Neither Union victory in the Civil War nor
Reconstruction came close to discharging America's debt to its
black citizens. Indeed, Reconstruction effectively enabled the
South to win the Civil War.40 Yet Juneteenth remains worth re-
membering and celebrating. Rail as we might (and should)
against the persistence of racism in America, the preservation of
the Union and the abolition of slavery define much of what is
good and heroic in American history. To borrow a key word from
the civil rights jurisprudence of Chief Justice Earl Warren, a ne-
gotiated peace with the Confederacy would have been "unthink-
37. On the political, social, and economic effects of Reconstruction, see gen-
erally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877 (1988); ALLAN NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA,
1865-1878 (1927); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-
1877 (1965).
38. WILLIAM FAULKNER, Requiem for a Nun, in NOVELS 1942-1954, at 471,
535 (Joseph Blotner & Noel Polk eds., 1994). In a very personal sense, the mem-
ory of the Civil War still lives. After the death of Alberta Martin on May 31,
2004, was reported as the death of the last widow of a Civil War veteran, see Al-
berta Martin, 97, Confederate Widow, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at A17, at
least one other living wife of a Civil War veteran was identified. James Barron,
The "Last Civil War Widow" Has a Successor, It Would Seem, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2004, at C15 (identifying Maudie Celia Hopkins, 89, of Lexa, Arkansas, who
married an octogenarian Confederate veteran in 1934, and speculating whether
other Civil War widows may still be alive). The passing of this human milestone,
anticipated at least since the publication of ALLAN GURGANUS, OLDEST LIVING
CONFEDERATE WIDOW TELLS ALL (1989), may well wait until the sesquicenten-
nial of the end of the Civil War.
39. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (enacted Aug. 6, 1965, and codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
40. See generally, e.g., STETSON KENNEDY, AFrER APPOMATTOX: HOW THE
SOUTH WON THE WAR (1995).
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able."4 1 At a certain level of abstraction, quibbling over the pre-
cise terms of either victory seems downright ungrateful.
Juneteenth acknowledges a fundamental truth: no matter
how long it is delayed, and no matter how imperfectly it is im-
plemented, emancipation beats the pants off enslavement. What
separates Juneteenth from other commemorations of wartime
victory is its sense of irony and its humility. Because of these
traits, and not in spite of them, Juneteenth's celebrants under-
stand the crucial point. However awkwardly accomplished, the
outlawing of slavery is a monumental achievement worth com-
memorating as long as the Republic endures.
Like emancipation in Texas, school desegregation came late
and accomplished far less than its beneficiaries might have hoped
and certainly deserved. And as with the Civil War, Brown merits
respect if only because the contrary outcome would have been so
abominable. For all its flaws, the judicial sequence beginning
with Brown is vastly preferable to its obvious alternative: a per-
petuation of racial segregation by law under the odious "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.42 Derrick Bell might
well have gotten his wish, albeit in hideously incomplete fashion:
the Supreme Court came very close to affirming Plessy before
Chief Justice Fred Vinson died on September 8, 1953,43 a hap-
penstance that Felix Frankfurter treated as evidence of divine in-
tervention.44 In this light, it seems as discourteous to condemn
Brown as it is to lament Union victory in the Civil War. The day
on which the Supreme Court of the United States finally aban-
doned Plessy and repudiated public school segregation as a prac-
tice repugnant to the Constitution therefore deserves to be me-
morialized in a fashion befitting the jubilee known as Juneteenth.
Indeed, May 17, 1954, deserves a name of comparable mirth. Eu-
terpe, muse of music and lyric poetry and mother of joy and
pleasure, demands no less. "Mayteenth" will do.
41. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ('In view of our decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated
public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose
a lesser duty on the Federal Government.").
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954).
43. See KLUGER, supra note 4, at 656.
44. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 278
(1997) (quoting two former law clerks' recollection of Justice Frankfurter's utter-
ance upon hearing of Chief Justice Vinson's death: 'This is the first indication
that I have ever had that there is a God.").
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II. BROWN AS TOUCHSTONE, THREAT, AND GUIDING
STAR
At nearly every level of abstraction, from the grand to the
particular, from the global to the personal, the civil rights strug-
gle that reached its climax in Brown is analogous to the Ameri-
can Civil War. Despite its drama and symbolism, Lee's surrender
at Appomattox Courthouse followed inevitably from the battles
that had preceded it. Gettysburg was the true proximate cause of
the Confederacy's military defeat; Ulysses Grant could afford to
lose tactical encounters in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania Court-
house, and at Cold Harbor as long as he held firm in his siege of
Petersburg.45 Indeed, given the Union's overwhelming material
advantages, the real wonder is how the Confederacy managed to
survive as long as it did.46
In the legal war on Jim Crow, the Supreme Court delivered a
series of decisions regarding law school and graduate school seg-
regation that all but suffocated Plessy. From Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada47 in 1938 to Sipuel v. Board of Regents48 in
1948 and the 1950 pair of Sweatt v. Painter9 and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 50 the Court systematically invalidated
segregation in public universities. The "separate but equal" for-
mula utterly failed to equalize differences in "qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for great-
ness" in any educational institution, such as the "reputation of
the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influ-
ence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige." 51
Michael J. Klarman's chronicle of the Supreme Court's civil'
rights jurisprudence, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, agrees that
de jure segregation by the 1950s was doomed to die. 52 Professor
Klarman, however, gives little or no credit to Brown and its May
45. See generally RICHARD E. BERINGER ET AL., WHY THE SOUTH LOST THE
CIVIL WAR (1986).
46. See Richard N. Current, God and the Strongest Battalions, in WHY THE
NORTH WON THE CIVIL WAR 3, 21-22 (David Donald ed., 1960).
47. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
48. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam).
49. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
50. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
51. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
52. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 377, 468 (2004).
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17, 1954, companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe.53 "[D]eep back-
ground forces," he argues, "ensured that the United States would
experience a racial reform movement regardless of what the Su-
preme Court did or did not do."5 4 One of those forces, rarely ac-
knowledged today, was the Cold War. Black soldiers, having laid
their lives on the line against the Axis powers, were as deter-
mined to fight Jim Crow as the white establishment was to com-
bat the communist bloc. 55 Racial segregation proved a major em-
barrassment in the United States' drive to undermine the Soviet
Union's international influence. Outright repudiation of segrega-
tion was necessary but not sufficient to secure moral high ground
in the Cold War. A persistent "gap between promise and
achievement" in America's quest for civil rights would demoral-
ize, even repulse potential allies abroad, "particularly. in what
would become known as the Third World."56 "Racism thus be-
came unpatriotic";5 7 opposition to it by any means necessary, a
"Cold War imperative."58
For their part, the defenders of Jim Crow also contested the
international front. In 1952, Senator John Bricker proposed a
constitutional amendment that would subject American legal ob-
ligations under international treaties to direct congressional
oversight.5 9 The Bricker amendment constituted a transparent
53. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
54. KLARMAN, supra note 52, at 468; see also Michael J. Klarman, The Puz-
zling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 813-14 (1991)
("A great deal of the school desegregation that ultimately flowed from Brown
appears to have been more directly attributable to the intervention of a racially-
enlightened national political process than to the Supreme Court...
55. See BELL, supra note 13, at 132.
56. CRAY, supra note 44, at 276.
57. Id.
58. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 61, 119 (1988). See generally BELL, supra note 13, at 59-68 (discussing how
the Cold War spurred racial reforms).
59. The Bricker amendment was introduced as Senate Joint Resolution 130
in February 1952. S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. (1952); see also S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong.
(1953). One version of the proposed amendment read as follows:
Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Consti-
tution shall not be of any force or effect.
Sec. 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the
United States only through legislation which would be valid in the
absence of treaty.
Sec. 3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and
other agreements with any foreign power or international organiza-
tion. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed
on treaties by this article.
Sec. 4. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
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attempt to insulate Jim Crow from international human rights
treaties. Proponents of the Bricker amendment listed segregation
among the "local customs and institutions" that were threatened
by obligations under international treaties. 60 Ironically, isolation-
ism became the dominant strategy of the political heirs of the
Confederate leaders who hoped that an embargo on cotton would
suffocate European textile mills and thereby spur European in-
tervention in favor of Southern secession. 61 "[T]he South said
plainly to all Europe: 'To get cotton you must swallow slavery."' 62
Europe refused, and the Confederacy's efforts to suppress its cot-
ton exports eventually deprived the Southern war effort of a lead-
ing source of cash.63
Whereas the economics of cotton and the politics of slavery
put the warring United States on the margins of diplomatic af-
fairs during the 1860s, Brown and the legal war on Jim Crow
projected the work of the Supreme Court onto a politically promi-
nent international stage. Before Brown, few if any Supreme
Court decisions attracted attention abroad. The work of the Court
today draws foreign commentary. 64 Brown alone did not spur this
appropriate legislation.
S. REP. NO. 83-412, at 26,006 (1953). See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN,
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 94-116
(1990); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratifica-
tion of the Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 341, 348-49 (1995).
60. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 112
(2000).
61. See generally FRANK LAWRENCE OWSLEY, KING COTTON DIPLOMACY:
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA (2d ed. 1959).
The historic work that persuaded many Southerners of Europe's dependence on
American cotton was DAVID CHRISTY, COTTON IS KING: OR SLAVERY IN THE
LIGHT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1855).
62. 1 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE; FROM SUMTER TO
PERRYVILLE 135 (1958).
63. See OWSLEY, supra note 61, at 263-64, 266 (reporting that the Confed-
eracy exported roughly one million bales of cotton throughout the Civil War,
about half of its wartime harvest); cf. STEPHEN R. WISE, LIFELINE OF THE
CONFEDERACY: BLOCKADE RUNNING DURING THE CIVIL WAR app. at 229 (1988)
(reporting that the South's cotton exports from September 1860 to August 1861
alone totaled approximately three million bales).
64. Although foreign courts do rely on the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisions, see, e.g., National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36, at *85-86, 145
n.133 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1985) and Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) in an opinion invalidating South Africa's criminal sodomy
laws), the Supreme Court's influence may be greater in nonconstitutional areas.
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change, but it did project the Supreme Court into the interna-
tional debate over human rights in both camps of the Cold War.
Professor Klarman's skepticism notwithstanding, Brown un-
doubtedly contributed to the consolidation of the United States'
"soft power" and to America's quest for high moral ground vis-A-
vis the Soviet bloc.
America became a fundamentally different country between
1861 and 1954, and its place in the world order reflected those
changes. Before Sumter, the United States occupied the fringes of
world affairs. But for high tariff barriers, America would have
imported most of its finished goods.65 The South in particular re-
lied on an economic strategy of exporting raw agricultural prod-
ucts to more developed markets. The region as a whole experi-
enced the spiritual hazards of cotton cultivation, a way of life
poisoned by "the doubleness that all jobs have by which one stays
alive and in which one's life is made a cheated ruin."66 America at
the time of its Civil War more closely resembled a nineteenth-
century equivalent of an oil-exporting Persian Gulf state than the
superpower that ultimately prevailed in the seventy-five-year se-
quence, 1914-89, that future historians will undoubtedly treat as
a single, continuous global conflict between totalitarianism and
democracy. By the time Brown reached the Supreme Court, how-
ever, the United States had tipped the tide of battle in one world
war and led the winning alliance in another. The country that
once pointedly refused to join the League of Nations now led
United Nations forces in Korea. The most shocking events of
1857 and 1957, respectively, reflected the transformation. Ameri-
cans in 1857 debated the Dred Scott decision 67 and the looming
national divide over slavery. A century later, American politi-
cians and educators panicked at the news that the Soviet Union
had launched a 183-pound orb named Sputnik into space. It is
better to finish second in a space race than first in a game of na-
See Peter Herzog, United States Supreme Court Cases in the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 903, 906-18
(1998). For example, foreign authorities often consult American antitrust cases.
See, e.g., R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Soc'y, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, 653-55
(Can.) (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 477 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)); Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home:
Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 115 (2000).
65. See generally SIDNEY RATNER, THE TARIFF IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1972).
66. JAMES AGEE & WALKER EVANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMous MEN 326
(2d ed. 1960).
67. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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tional Russian roulette.
Professor Klarman does stand on very firm ground in one re-
spect: Supreme Court decisions tend to be accorded too much sig-
nificance, both positive and negative, in legal commentary. Pro-
fessionals who make a living by analyzing judicial decisions are
bound to overestimate the Supreme Court's influence on public
life. 68 At best the Justices "try[] with [their] puny hand[s] first to
urge on, and then to hold back, the tide of the vast popular cur-
rent that [is] bearing [them] along with it."69 School desegrega-
tion and the judicial role in it did not precipitate, but rather fol-
lowed, the social transformation of twentieth-century America. In
roughly one decade, the mechanical cotton picker and the boll
weevil accomplished a feat for which neither the Civil War nor
Reconstruction could claim credit: rendering "obsolete the share-
cropper system" that had supplanted the plantation system but
retained its essentially feudal culture.70 Whereas the cotton gin
had enabled the plantation system of slave labor to conquer the
South, the mechanical cotton picker "made the maintenance of
segregation no longer a matter of necessity for the economic es-
tablishment of the South."71 For its part, the boll weevil "was
probably responsible for more changes in the number of farms,
farm acreage, and farm population [during the 1920s] than all
other causes put together."72 From World War I to roughly 1970,
the resulting economic dislocation pushed six and a half million
black Americans from South to North in "one of the largest and
68. For a thorough examination of this phenomenon, see Mark A. Graber,
Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's Thesis Revis-
ited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2004); cf. R.H. Coase, The Market for
Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 390 (1974) (arguing
that differences in academic attitudes toward governmental regulation of eco-
nomic markets and toward regulation of free speech stem largely from profes-
sors' self-interest in "measures... which increase the demand for the services of
intellectuals"), reprinted in R.H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND
ECONOMISTS 64, 73 (1994); E.G. West, The Political Economy of American Public
School Legislation, 10 J.L. & ECON. 101, 114-16 (1967) (same).
69. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 786 (Constance Garrett trans., The
Modern Library 1931) (1869).
70. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK
MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 5 (1991).
71. Id. at 6.
72. 4 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FIFTEENTH
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930, at 12 (1932); cf. Tex. Boll Weevil Eradica-
tion Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. 1997) (observing that
the boll weevil still "presents a major economic threat to the Texas cotton indus-
try" and "causes an estimated $20 million in crop loss in Texas every year").
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most rapid mass internal movements of people in history."73
Brown and, for that matter, all other legal and political de-
velopments of the civil rights era took place against this dramatic
social backdrop. With a foresight that can scarcely be credited to
the Justices, demographers of the 1950s anticipated that the next
generation of legal and political issues would grow from the coun-
try's adaptation to the rapidly accelerating migration "of Negroes
from the South to the other parts of the country," especially into
"very largely... urban areas."74 The Supreme Court barely no-
ticed the prime mover of white migration during the Great De-
pression, as though the Justices were blind to the dust sweeping
across the "red country.., of Oklahoma."76 As late as 1932, as
the great agrarian migrations of the early twentieth century were
well under way, the Court characterized cotton cultivation in
Oklahoma as an industry "of such paramount importance ...
that the general welfare and prosperity of the state in a very
large and real sense depend upon its maintenance."76 At most, by
1941, the Court would grudgingly acknowledge the Depression's
"grave and perplexing social and economic dislocation[s]" and
signal its "appreciat[ion] that the spectacle of large segments of
our population constantly on the move has given rise to urgent
demands upon the ingenuity of government." 77
Aside from calibrating the proper amount of credit or blame
to assign to the Supreme Court, it makes no difference whether
Brown was a byproduct of overwhelming social forces rather than
a catalyst. By its own terms-that is, as a pivotal moment in ju-
dicial interpretation of the Constitution-Brown does mark an
epochal change in the Supreme Court's approach to equal protec-
tion. A mere twenty-seven years earlier, Justice Holmes had
mocked equal protection as "the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments."7 8 By the latter half of the twentieth century, equal
protection would become "the first resort of constitutional argu-
73. LEMANN, supra note 70, at 6.
74. CONRAD TAEUBER & IRENE B. TAEUBER, THE CHANGING POPULATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 109-11 (1958); cf. TONI MORRISON, JAZZ 33 (1992)
("[H]ow soon country people forget. When they fall in love with a city, it is for
forever, and it is like forever. As though there never was a time when they didn't
love it .... There, in a city, they are not so much new as themselves: their
stronger, riskier selves.").
75. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 1 (Viking Press 1967).
76. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 276 (1932).
77. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
78. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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ment."79
Before Brown, the inspirational slogan in the Supreme Court
building's west pediment, "Equal Justice Under Law," was little
more than a decorative element suggested by architect Cass Gil-
bert.8 0 The phrase, after all, appears in none of the formal sources
of American constitutional law-not the Constitution itself, nor
The Federalist Papers, nor any Supreme Court opinion before
1948.81 When massive resistance to Brown challenged the Court's
very legitimacy, however, Chief Justice Warren declared that the
"Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized th[e] ideal"
of "equal justice under law."8 2 The old Chief Justice even opened
his memoirs by invoking the "awesome sight" and "Grecian seren-
ity" of the "most beautiful building in Washington, D.C.," and the
"inspiring" words "chiseled in white marble above the main en-
trance."8 3 Its architectural origins having been fully embraced by
the Justices; the phrase "equal justice under law" now routinely
adorns the legal work as well as the physical infrastructure of the
Supreme Court.8 4 Betrayed after the Civil War and neglected for
nearly a century beyond Reconstruction, the constitutional aspi-
79. Edward J. Larson, The Scopes Trial and the Evolving Concept of Free-
dom, 85 VA. L. REV. 503, 507 (1999).
80. See Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, The East
Pediment: Information Sheet 2 (Aug. 18, 2000), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/eastpediment.pdf; cf. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institu-
tional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft
Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2001) (noting how Gilbert hoped that the
new Supreme Court building would combine "all the beauty, charm and dignity
of the Lincoln Memorial" with "the practical qualities of a first-rate office build-
ing" (quoting a January 16, 1929, letter from Cass Gilbert to William Howard
Taft)).
81. The first instances of the phrase, "equal justice under law," in United
States Reports are attributable to Justice Jackson. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 335
U.S. 876, 877 (1948) (per curiam) (separate statement of Jackson, J.); see also
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 175 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring). In
1956, Justice Black acknowledged that the challenge of "[p]roviding equal justice
for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem." Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956); see also id. at 16 n.10 ("Ye shall do no unrighteous-
ness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the
person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor." (quot-
ing Leviticus 19:15)).
82. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
83. CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 1
(1977).
84. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 983-84 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1271 (Fla. 1977)); Olff v.
East Side Union High Sch. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1044 n.2 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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ration of equal protection of the laws has become the contempo-
rary Supreme Court's civil rights polestar, L'Etoile du Nord for
America reborn.8 5
The failure to deliver full civil rights is a recurring theme in
American legal history. Although federal courts have fancied
themselves the champions of "[g]roups which find themselves un-
able to achieve their objectives through the ballot,"8 6 the record of
judicial failure runs deep. The Supreme Court's first opportunity
to interpret the Civil War amendments would curb those provi-
sions' reach for generations. In the Slaughter-House Cases,8 7 the
Court did recognize that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments shared a common "pervading purpose": "the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him."88 The Court nevertheless de-
fended the presumed sovereignty of the states vis-A-vis the fed-
eral government. A contrary approach, even over civil rights,
would allegedly "fetter and degrade the State governments by
subjecting them to the control of Congress" and would "radically
change[] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Fed-
eral governments to each other and of both these governments to
the people."89
In the immediate aftermath of the Slaughter-House Cases,
the Supreme Court repeatedly curbed the reach of federal civil
rights legislation. 'The fourteenth amendment," said the Court,
"adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another."90
The Court crippled federal responses to atrocities in the postwar
85. Compare MiNN. STAT. § 1.135(3)(f)(1) (2002) (mandating that the Great
Seal of the State of Minnesota include the inscription L'Etoile du Nord), with
DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO OF DANTE, canto XXXIV, 11. 138-40, at 303
(Robert Pinsky trans., 6th prtg. 1997) ('Through a round aperture I saw appear /
Some of the beautiful things that Heaven bears, / Where we came forth, and
once more saw the stars.").
86. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (noting that such groups
"frequently turn to the courts").
87. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
88. Id. at 71; accord, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307
(1879); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-35 (1879) ("One great pur-
pose of these amendments was to raise the colored race from that condition of
inferiority and servitude in which most of them had previously stood, into per-
fect equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the
States.").
89. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
90. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
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South, ranging from the impairment of voting rights91 to grue-
some acts of racial violence. 92 In 1883, the Civil Rights Cases93
struck the hardest blow: the Court invalidated the public accom-
modation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Insisting that
the Fourteenth Amendment affected solely "State action of a par-
ticular character" without reaching "[i]ndividual invasion of indi-
vidual rights,"94 the Court curbed Congress's power to punish
"every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make
as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take
into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or
deal with in other matters of intercourse or business."95 The Civil
Rights Cases "firmly embedded" the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful."96
Brown and the judicial quest for integration ran ashore on
the same regard for localism and state sovereignty. Having iden-
tified "education [as] perhaps the most important function of
[contemporary] state and local governments,"97 Brown then over-
stated the difficulty of educational administration. The Court an-
ticipated that "the wide applicability" of its decision and "the
great variety of local conditions" would swamp "the formulation
91. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875). But cf. Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662, 666-67 (1884) (upholding the application of the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 to private actors who committed violence against
black voters in a congressional election).
92. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 630, 641 (1882) (lynch mob
murder of prisoners under the custody of a deputy sheriff); Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
at 548-49 (massacre of freedmen and Republican partisans after a disputed
election). Arising in the aftermath of "perhaps the bloodiest racial conflict in
Louisiana history"--or, for that matter, in American history-Cruikshank in-
validated the convictions of three members of a "veritable army" of "old time Ku
Klux Klan" who killed no fewer than "60 freedmen... after they had surren-
dered" and left the victims' mutilated bodies "to rot in the parching sun."
ROBERT J. KAcZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at
175 (1985).
93. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
94. Id. at 11; cf. Harris, 106 U.S. at 640 (invalidating a federal anticon-
spiracy statute that was "directed exclusively against the action of private per-
sons, without reference to the laws of the State or their administration by her
officers").
95. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25.
96. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); accord, e.g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,
423-24 (1973); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966).
97. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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of decrees" with "problems of considerable complexity." 98 The
1955 case that would become known as Brown 11 adopted an in-
famous remedial formula: local school officials would be expected
to proceed with "all deliberate speed ' 99 in working with supervis-
ing federal courts to overcome "problems related to administra-
tion, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the
school transportation system, personnel, revision of school dis-
tricts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a sys-
tem of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial
basis."100
Integration never fully took root because the school officials
addressed by Brown II intended no such thing. In many in-
stances, even the federal district judges charged with implement-
ing integration impeded the project. Brown did not demand that
"the states must mix persons of different races in the schools,"
wrote a federal district court panel in South Carolina. 101 'The
Constitution... does not require integration.... It merely for-
bids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation."'102
The judge who presided over a suit to desegregate the Dallas,
Texas schools declined to "name any date or issue any order" on
the grounds that "the white man has a right to maintain his ra-
cial integrity and it can't be done so easily in integrated
schools." 10 3 At the height of massive resistance, Prince Edward
County, Virginia, one of the original parties to the Brown litiga-
tion, tried unsuccessfully to close its public schools in a desperate
bid to avoid integration. 104 A full decade after declaring that
"constitutional rights.., are not to be sacrificed or yielded to...
violence and disorder,"10 5 the Court finally invalidated the popu-
lar but illusory and utterly ineffective "freedom of choice" plans
deployed throughout the South. 06 Three years later and seven-
teen years after Brown, the Court finally endorsed aggressive
remedies such as busing. 107 At the same time, the Court fore-
shadowed Brown's eventual disappearance. Once a school system
98. Id. at 495.
99. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
100. Id. at 300-01.
101. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (per curiam).
102. Id.
103. J.W. PELTASON, FIFW-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 119 (1961).
104. See Griffin v. County Sch Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
105. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
106. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
107. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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"achieved full compliance with" Brown, such a "unitary" system
would face no further obligation to maintain racial balance "in a
growing, mobile society" after the system had discharged "the af-
firmative duty to desegregate" and to eliminate "racial discrimi-
nation through official action."10 8
The allure of localism would eventually undermine Brown as
a guiding principle in public school administration. Confronted
with "white flight"-the phenomenon anticipated by the Justices'
ominous observation that "the communities served by [unitary
school] systems" would not necessarily "remain demographically
stable"1 09 -the Court refused to sanction interdistrict remedies in
the absence of a showing "that there has been a constitutional
violation within one district that produces a significant segrega-
tive effect in another district," a demonstration "that racially dis-
criminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single
school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict seg-
regation."11 0 The Supreme Court's approach to education, even
outside the context of desegregation, rests squarely on the prem-
ise that "[n]o area of social concern stands to profit more" from a
commitment to local control "than does public education."1 1 The
Court remains beholden to claims that academic administration
is at once complex and benign, as though this class of state actors
and no other should be "presumed" to be acting in "good faith"
absent some "showing to the contrary."112 An observer given no
other evidence besides the Supreme Court's decisions would con-
clude that it was the American dream of racial integration, and
not the deviant experiment called the Confederacy, that "Died of
[the] Theory" of states' rights. 113
One part of Brown's legacy emphatically is not theoretical.
108. Id. at 31-32.
109. Id. at 31.
110. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
111. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973); accord
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 329 (1983); see also Wright v. Council of Em-
poria, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972) ('Direct control over decisions vitally affecting
the education of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our society .. ");
id. at 478 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Local control is not only vital to continued
public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educa-
tional standpoint as well.").
112. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.); accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
113. 3 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE: RED RIVER TO
APPOMATTOX 766 (1974) (quoting Jefferson Davis) (emphasis removed). On
whether an ideological dedication to states' rights undermined the Southern war
effort, see BERINGER ET AL., supra note 45, at 203-35, 443-57.
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The living experience of the millions of students who have passed
through America's public schools in the past fifty years includes
astonishing stories of personal struggle and family sacrifice. The
state motto of Kansas, where Brown began, expresses the perfect
sentiment. Ad astra per aspera: through hardship to the stars.114
In Topeka, Oliver Brown's family single handedly carried
Brown's torch for forty years. Exactly a quarter century after the
Supreme Court "conclude[d] that in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," 115 the Brown
family returned to court. In 1979, Linda Brown Smith, the school-
girl on whose behalf Brown had been litigated, sued the Topeka
school board for the benefit of her own children.116 For the next
fourteen years, the case wended through the federal courts, twice
reaching the Supreme Court. 117 On July 25, 1994, almost exactly
four decades after Brown, the federal district court for Kansas
approved a desegregation plan submitted by Unified School Dis-
trict #501 of Topeka. The court's admonition that the parties
should "negotiate and cooperate in bringing the case to an end"
effectively closed one of the longest, hardest fought, and doctri-
nally richest clusters of legal proceedings in American history. 118
To add further nuance to the story, let us glance east at
DeKalb County, Georgia, where the 1992 case of Freeman v.
Pitts119 (along with Board of Education v. Dowel 1 20 and the final
phase of Missouri v. Jenkinsl21) is widely considered to have
ended the Brown cycle. 122 On May 18, 1954, one day after the
114. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 73-2403(a) (2002).
115. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
116. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383, 391 n.4 (D. Kan. 1979).
117. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated mem.,
503 U.S. 978 (1992); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993).
118. Paul E. Wilson, Ad Astra per Aspera: Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 68 UMKC L. REV. 623, 636 (2000).
119. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
120. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). Ironically, the Dowell litigation's first visit to the
Supreme Court generated a per curiam decision ordering the immediate imple-
mentation of a desegregation plan pending further appeals. The earlier Dowell
decision observed that "[t]he burden on a school board is to desegregate an un-
constitutional dual system at once." Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 269, 270
(1969) (per curiam).
121. 515 U.S. 70 (1995); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989). See generally Alison Morantz, Money
and Choice in Kansas City: Major Investments with Modest Returns, in
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 241 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996).
122. See generallY, e.g., PETR .1 S RO' CHILDREN: T HE BROKEN
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Supreme Court decided Brown, DeKalb County broke ground on
Hamilton High School, a segregated school intended to replace
Avondale Colored Elementary and High School. 123 Hamilton
High would boast a library and a cafeteria. Mirabile dictu, Ham-
ilton would even have indoor plumbing. Thanks to the county's
decision during the 1950s to install toilets in all new schools for
blacks, many of DeKalb's black students would flush a toilet for
the first time in their lives. At Hamilton High's groundbreaking
ceremony, County Superintendent Jim Cherry dismissed Brown
as 'largely an abstraction" and predicted that Georgia schools
would continue to segregate the races. Cherry was right: Hamil-
ton High served as one of DeKalb County's de jure schools for
blacks for the next fifteen years. Caught in a vise between new
litigation inspired by the Supreme Court's invalidation of free-
dom-of-choice plans in the 1968 case of Green v. County School
Board124 and federal officials' threat to deny funding under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,125 DeKalb
County closed its black schools in 1969. Hamilton High's students
were dispersed into four historically white schools: Avondale,
Clarkston, Druid Hills, and Shamrock. 126 In a historical twist as
tragic as it was "ironic," "the institutions that sustained blacks
during segregation were themselves destroyed in an effort to
combat its vestiges."127
Hamilton High was by no means unique. Black students in
formerly segregated schools bore the brunt of sudden transfers
into often hostile new schools that were integrated solely in the
strictest legal sense. Jobs held by black teachers and staffers at
formerly segregated schools did not reappear elsewhere within
nominally unitary school systems. Hamilton's heirs have also un-
dergone transformations experienced by many other schools after
PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION 259-88 (2002) (discussing the Brown cycle's
final stages).
123. The story of Hamilton High is told in Jim Auchmutey & Gracie Bonds
Staples, Amid the Battle, a School Flourished, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 16,
2004, at Al. Much of the information in this paragraph and the next is drawn
from the Auchmutey and Staples article.
124. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
125. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C.).
126. Clarkston High School is my alma mater; I spent eight years in DeKalb
County schools. To my shame, Clarkston ranked among Hamilton's successors
as a "school[] ... located in [a] communit[y] that had a reputation for being less
than friendly to blacks." Auchmutey & Staples, supra note 123.
127. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 749 (1992) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
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Brown finally took effect. Avondale High School, one of Hamilton
High's four successors, has almost fully resegregated; its white
student population numbers fifty out of 1059.128 Fighting ram-
pant resegregation is merely one of the overwhelming tasks that
confront public school administrators today. 129 I am told that
Clarkston High School, another successor to Hamilton, now hosts
the polyglot student population so typical of many urban and
suburban public schools.130 Keeping the peace across historically
antagonistic racial lines is merely one of many goals that test-
and often elude-contemporary public school administrators.
DeKalb County's challenge today is no longer that of raising
massive resistance to Brown or heeding with all deliberate speed
the desegregation decrees that finally issued forth, but rather
that of educating a multiracial, multilingual society whose com-
plexity overwhelms the relatively simplistic world described in
Brown and its companion cases. "[C]ommunity prejudices are not
static, and from time to time" the federal courts must rise to the
aid of new and "easily identifiable groups which.., requireD the
aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws."'131
Operating a public school today in DeKalb County-or, if Keyes v.
School District No. 1132 means anything, in any district where
schools were managed according to informal but invidious racial
considerations--demands familiarity not only with Brown, but
also with Gong Lum v. Rice,133 both major civil rights cases styled
128. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INFORMATION
ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at
http://nces.ed.gov/ccdlsearch.asp (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). As I
understand it, other than refugees from Bosnia, as few as four white students
attend Avondale High. See also E-mail from M.W. Worthington, Principal,
Avondale High School to Minnesota Law Review (Sept. 2, 2004) (on file with
the Minnesota Law Review) ("Our data reflects that other than refugees we
have very few if any... non-African-American students.").
129. Avondale is by no means alone in its transformation from white by law
to integrated to predominantly black. Brown High School in Atlanta-named for
Joseph E. Brown, the virulently secessionist governor of Georgia during the Civil
War-would have been my alma mater had my family stayed in the West End of
Atlanta, the neighborhood where we settled as immigrants from Taiwan. Once
reserved for whites, Brown High today "is still segregated": "Except for three
Asian students, Brown... is all black." Martha M. Ezzard, Black, White &
Brown: School Still Segregated Even Though Pendulum Has Swung Other Way,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 4, 2004, at El.
130. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra
note 128.
131. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
132. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
133. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
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Hernandez,134 and a language discrimination jurisprudence con-
necting the 1920s 135 with the post-Brown civil rights era. 1
36 Col-
lectively, those cases stand for propositions that seem too obvious
to state but in practice are ignored more often than they are ob-
served. Race relations in America run beyond black and white.
Multiculturalism must be gauged by the ear as well as the eye.
And, most important of all, in matters of justice nothing comes
quickly, easily, or free of cost.
Fairly assessing Brown's legacy demands close attention to
"stubborn facts."137 This is no easy task, for the "starlit or...
moonlit dome" of social meaning routinely "disdains / All that
man is, / All mere complexities, / The fury and the mire of human
veins."138 The half century since Brown has marked progress in
134. Compare Hernandez, 347 U.S. 475, with Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion).
135. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels
v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
136. The principal case in this regard is Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
Lau held that a school system's failure to provide meaningful education to non-
English speaking students violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which bars discrimination "on the ground of race, color, or national origin [in] ...
any program or activity" receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). As a
whole, the Supreme Court's approach to language policy since 1927 defies easy
description. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), upheld a provision of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that secured the right to vote for any person who
"has successfully completed the sixth primary grade" in an "American-flag"
school "in which the predominant classroom language was other than English."
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2000); see Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643 & n.1. The Court has
implicitly upheld Congress's power to ban English-only elections. See Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(f)(1), 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (amended
1975), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b()(1) (2000); Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 405-06 & n.2
(1977); New York v. United States, 419 U.S. 888 (1974). Disavowing any sugges-
tion to the contrary in Lau, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), refused
to recognize a private cause of action under Title VI for alleged discrimination
against non-English speakers. The only case ever to raise a direct constitutional
attack on legislation declaring English the official language of a state was dis-
missed as moot. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 48-
49 (1997). Rather than treating linguistic discrimination as a constitutional or
statutory violation in its own right, the contemporary Supreme Court tends to
treat laws harming native speakers of languages besides English as superficially
neutral policies with a racially disparate impact. See Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 376 (1991) (plurality opinion); cf. United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (upholding the use of federal officers' perception
of motorists' "apparent Mexican ancestry" to make selective referrals to secon-
dary inspection areas at immigration checkpoints).
137. Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 605 (1945).
138. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Byzantium, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
W.B. YEATS: A NEW EDITION 248, 248 (11. 4-7) (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1989).
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some domains and frustration in others. On one hand, black
households earning at least $50,000 a year (in real dollars) have
tripled since the end of the Great Migration, from 9.1% in 1967 to
27.8% in 2001.139 On the other hand, educational equity remains
elusive. In a society that properly refuses "to assume that any-
thing that is predominantly black must be inferior,"'140 the deci-
sive criterion is not the racial profile of our public schools, but
rather the academic performances of children of all racial and
ethnic backgrounds.
By that gauge, the National Assessment of Educational Pro-
gress (NAEP) paints a grim picture. 141 The typical black and His-
panic twelfth grader would finish behind three-quarters of white
twelfth graders. In five of the seven subjects tested by the NAEP,
a majority of black students perform in the "below basic" cate-
gory. This rating, the NAEP's lowest, indicates that these stu-
dents lack even a "partial" mastery of the "fundamental" knowl-
edge and skills expected of twelfth graders. In math, so few black
students fit the NAEP's "advanced" category that the test rounds
the rate of black proficiency in this subject to zero. By contrast,
3% of white students and 7% of Asian students reached the ad-
vanced level of mathematical proficiency in 2000.142 These de-
moralizing statistics fuel resentful speculation that Brown has
spurred no positive change, but rather has merely "reinforc[ed]
the belief in a legal strategy for change of those already commit-
ted to it."143
Yet the very terms of the debate over Brown's legacy illus-
trate how much progress has been accomplished in fifty years.
Much of the remaining academic and political rancor concerns
the peculiar practice of race-conscious university admissions,
139. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-HOUSEHOLDS,
HOUSEHOLDS BY TOTAL MONEY INCOME, RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN OF
HOUSEHOLDER: 1967 TO 2001, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/
hl7.html (last revised May 13, 2004); Samuel G. Freedman, Still Separate, Still
Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, § 7, at 8 (reporting these census statistics).
140. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
141. My interpretation of these NAEP statistics is based on figures reported
in Abigail Thernstrom, The Brown Decision: 'A Shining Moment," EDUC. WK.,
May 19, 2004, at 52. I have reinterpreted the NAEP statistics, NAT'L CTR. OF
EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAEP DATA, at http://nces.ed.gov/ na-
tionsreportcardlnaepdatasearch.asp, with considerable assistance from Eliza-
beth Maxeiner. Memorandum from Elizabeth Maxeiner to Jim Chen (July 13,
2004) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter Maxeiner].
142. See Maxeiner, supra note 141.
143. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOTT S IAT. -.TAN9 1561 (1QQ1
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perhaps the least socially significant and most needlessly conten-
tious civil rights debate of the last half century. 144 Judge J. Har-
vie Wilkinson's proverbial path from Brown to Bakke spanned
twenty-four years. 145 After Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,146 it took the Supreme Court a quarter century to reex-
amine educational affirmative action. The full path from Brown
to Grutter v. Bollinger147 and Gratz v. Bollinger148 coincides al-
most precisely with Brown's semicentennial. The Court's impas-
sioned debate over these 2003 cases conceals a broad and impor-
tant consensus: in an ideal society, universities would and should
achieve educational diversity without reference to race. At heart
the Justices disagree solely as to the exact moment when race-
conscious admissions will wither away. Placing that moment in
the year 2028,149 some indefinite point beyond that,150 or now151
is a legalistic luxury made possible by an earlier judicial genera-
tion's courageous determination to dismantle Jim Crow root and
branch.
Eventually this country as a whole will adopt the creed that
a prescient legal scholar proclaimed in Bakke's immediate wake
(on the silver anniversary of Brown): "[o]ne gets beyond racism by
getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible com-
mitment never to tolerate in one's own life--or in the life or prac-
tices of one's government-the differential treatment of other
human beings by race." 152 Such disagreements as remain go
144. See Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory
and Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 905-09 (1998); cf. Mark
A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal
Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 818 (1997) (criticizing legal scholar-
ship that treats disappointed university professors and students as "the
wretched of the earth" even as it ignores issues of greater concern to those "who
live in the streets and beg for scraps of garbage to eat").
145. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWNTO BAKKE (1979).
146. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
147. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
148. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
149. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 ('We expect that 25 years from now, the use
of racial preferences will no longer be necessary ....").
150. See id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("From today's vantage point,
one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, pro-
gress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it
safe to sunset affirmative action.").
151. See id. at 375 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("While I agree that in 25 years the practices of the Law School will be illegal,
they are [also] ... illegal now.').
152. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and
the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979).
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strictly to timing. If Brown teaches anything, it is the value of pa-
tience. The state of race relations in America fifty years after
Brown offers substantial hope that this country will have over-
come race and racism before Bakke turns fifty. The dream of an
America beyond race having taken firm root, there is no need to
quibble over "the fine points of a principle that will, I am confi-
dent," in time "command the support of a majority of [the]
Court."
1 5 3
In the meanwhile, Americans of good conscience do disagree
on the precise means by which to bridge annoyingly persistent
gaps in racial equality. Here lie the perils of placing too much
faith in the courts, let alone a single judicial decision. As a recipe
for navigating the treacherous waters of American race relations,
as a step-by-step guide to social justice, Brown has failed. Or so
its sharpest critics would have us believe. By that criterion, how-
ever, the Civil War was also an abject failure. Perhaps redemp-
tion lies in keeping things simple. Justice Potter Stewart under-
stood that Chief Justice Earl Warren's "great strength" lay in "his
simple belief in the things [others] ... laugh at-motherhood,
marriage, family, flag, and the like."15 4 Justice Stewart, after all,
knew greatness (among other things) when he saw it.155 Like its
author, Brown has overcome what it lacks in "genuine intellec-
tual distinction" with "decency, stability, sincerity."'156 Disap-
pointed as we may be with the Civil War and, yes, with Brown,
these historical milestones did manage to establish some simple,
timeless truths-truths worth keeping as the legal building
blocks of a pluralistic, democratic society.
Stripped to their essentials, the truths derived from the Civil
War and the twentieth century's civil rights movement are these:
Juneteenth celebrates the Civil War's goal, however imperfectly
achieved, of emancipating the slaves and erasing the vestiges of
the racist legal system designed to sustain slavery. With compa-
rably mixed success, Brown ended one of the most odious prac-
tices that survived the Civil War and Reconstruction, racial seg-
regation by law. Both campaigns delivered substantial if
153. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME
COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 139 (1983).
155. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("[Plerhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly [defining obscenity]. But I know
it when I see it ....").
156. JOHN GUNTHER, INSIDE U.S.A. 20-21 (1974); see also id. at 18 (noting
that Warren would "never set the world on fire or even ak sok").
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inadequate gains, and both achieved enough to inspire further
work toward societal justice. The ultimate prize, a society fully
liberated from the shackles of race, lies in sight.
III. MAYTEENTH AND THE MYSTIC CHORDS OF
MEMORY
The Union did win the Civil War after all, though it has
taken the better part of a century and a half for "[t]he mystic
chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field, and patriot
grave, to every living heart and hearth-stone, all over this broad
land," to be "touched ... by the better angels of our nature."'157
The Civil War fell far short of expiating America's original sin. To
this day the legacies of slavery overshadow and taint the illusory
' Treasury of Virtue" derived from the Union's victory, lest any
American fallaciously "feels redeemed by history, automatically
redeemed." 158 The jubilee called Juneteenth nevertheless cele-
brates the end of the Civil War, fully aware that victory then was
anything but crisp and that even today, monumental work still
lies ahead. The transformation of Juneteenth from a regional,
almost exclusively black holiday to a nationwide celebration by
and for all Americans universalizes the lessons of the Civil War.
"[E]very man is, in the end, a sacrifice for every other man."15 9
Or, to state the point even more lyrically: "The gentle serpent,
green in the mulberry bush / Riots with his tongue through the
hush-/ Sentinel of the grave who counts us all!"'160
Likewise, Brown did not end the struggle against institu-
tionalized racism, but rather signaled the beginning of a new bat-
tle. Its enduring triumph lies in the American people's belated
but emphatic rejection of massive resistance. Race relations are
imperfect, but better than ever before in American history. The
United States of America in 2004 has achieved greater under-
standing across racial and cultural lines than any other polity
anywhere, anytime. But the work of delivering complete justice
across racial lines remains. Though Brown alone has not and will
157. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address: March 4, 1861, in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIs SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 579, 588 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1946).
158. ROBERT PENN WARREN, THE LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR: MEDITATIONS
ON THE CENTENNIAL 59 (1961).
159. ROBERT PENN WARREN, WILDERNESS: A TALE OF THE CIVIL WAR 302
(1961).
160. ALLEN TATE, Ode to the Confederate Dead, in POEMS 19, 23 (1960).
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not reach that future bliss, 16 1 it has helped our eyes to see the
glory of its coming. In marching toward the promised land that
Brown enabled us to glimpse, we must keep the faith. "Nothing is
irredeemable until it is past."'162
To celebrate Mayteenth-the May 17 anniversary of Brown
v. Board of Education-is to celebrate the civil rights advances of
America's Second Reconstruction. They were late in coming and
less than fully satisfactory, but victories already won are worth
celebrating in anticipation of others yet to come. As America's
greatest expatriate poet would remind the land of his birth:
A people without history
Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern
Of timeless moments. 163
161. Compare Deuteronomy 34:1-4 ("And the LORD shewed [Moses] all the
[promised] land .... And the LORD said unto him, This is the land which I
sware ... , saying, I will give it unto thy seed: I have caused thee to see it with
thine eyes, but thou shalt not go over thither."), with Jeremiah 31:31-34:
Behold, the days come, saith the LORD, that I will make a new cove-
nant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: Not ac-
cording to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that
I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt .... I
will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and
will be their God, and they shall be my people.... [Flor they shall all
know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them.., for I
will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.
Id.
162. 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 997 (Pantheon Books 1972) (1944), quoted in Daniel A.
Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 934
(1994).
163. T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 29, 38 (Harcourt, Brace
& Co. 1943).
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